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Abstract 
On 25 October 2016, the European Commission (EC) presented two legislative proposals to 
create a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) for the European Union (EU). 
The proposals represent a re-launch of the 2011 CCCTB proposal, which was blocked by 
the Council. The 2011 file proposed a creation of an optional tax base, in which enterprises 
would have been able to choose whether to apply the national rules or the common ones. In 
the 2016 proposal, however, the European Commission intended to make the CCCTB 
compulsory for multinational enterprises. The paper uses the multiple streams theoretical 
framework to explain the failure of previous attempts and the potential success of the 2016 
ambitious re-launch. The main argument states that there has been no coupling of policy 
streams in 1988 and 2011, however in 2016 the European Commission managed to couple 
three policy streams (problems, solutions and politics) and use the window of opportunity. 
 
 
1 
 
“Harmonization of taxation is viewed by the Commission  
as the final step of completing the internal market”. 1 
(Official of the Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU). 
 
The idea of harmonizing direct corporate taxation between European states has been 
on the table since the 1960s.2 The reason lies in the essence of the EU, its cornerstone – the 
single market.3 The freedom of establishment allows companies that are officially registered 
in one of the EU Member States (MS) to “enjoy the freedom of movement of persons, services 
and capital, to encourage businesses to operate over borders”.4 However, it also facilitates 
profit shifting, tax evasion and tax avoidance, as businesses are often set up in the MS where 
the best conditions are provided– e.g. where corporate tax rates are the lowest - and declare 
all the revenues there (as the EU has no competence at setting the tax rates).5  
The founding fathers defined the link between the success of the single market project 
and tax policy since the very beginning.6 Nevertheless, for many decades this goal remained 
an aspiration, as MS opposed practically any action that could have taken away their sovereign 
right to set rules of corporate taxation.7 This is due to the fact that “voters and governments 
care deeply about taxes and insist on keeping a close check on tax policy-making”.8 Such 
sensitivity over the issue is evident in the article 115 TFEU, which relates to the EU decision-
making in direct taxation: legislation related to direct taxation ought to be decided by the 
                                                 
1 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU, Brussels, 5 March 2018. 
2 C. Radaelli, ‘Corporate Direct Taxation in the European Union: Explaining the Policy Process’, Journal of 
Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 2, 1995, p. 163. 
3 P. Genschel, ‘One trap, Many Exits, but No Free Lunch: How the Joint-Decision Trap Shapes EU Tax Policy’, 
in G. Falkner (ed.), The EU’s Decision Traps, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 54.  
4 ‘Fact sheets on the European Union: Company law’, European Parliament, retrieved 23 April 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.11.html 
5 ‘Taxation’, European Commission, 2018, retrieved 23 April 2018, https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/taxation_en 
6 Genschel, op. cit., p. 55. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p. 54. 
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special legislative procedure in which the Council votes by unanimity after consultation with 
the EP and the Economic and Social Committee.9 
This research paper concentrates specifically on the corporate tax area. Since 2007, 
there has been an important increase in the amount of legislation adopted in the field of 
corporate tax, as well as of EC proposals that are still pending at the Council.10 Nevertheless, 
proposals for Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) and Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB), public country-by-country reporting, tax transparency for intermediaries, 
and related to fair taxation for the digital economy are still pending before the Council.11 
The main focus of the paper is the proposal for creation of a common corporate tax 
base in the EU, which  has been discussed since the 1970s.12 A full draft of the proposal to 
harmonise the taxable benefits of companies was prepared in 1988, but it has never been tabled 
“due to the reluctance of most Member states”.13 On the 23rd of May 2001, the EC published 
the communication on “Tax policy in the EU – Priorities for the years ahead”, in which it had 
set out the plan to re-launch the process of harmonization of corporate taxation.14 Even though 
the action was called for in 2001, the proposal for an optional common corporate tax base was 
put on the table only in 2011.15 The file was blocked at the Council.16 However, according to 
tax attachés of both the French and the Irish permanent representations to the EU, the 
                                                 
9 Article 114 TFEU 
10 ‘Legislative train schedule’, European Parliament, 2018, retrieved 23 April 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-
industrial-base-taxation 
11 Ibid. 
12 ‘Taxation’, European Commission, retrieved 23 April 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/ 
taxation_en 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM (2011) 121/4, Brussels, 16 March 2011. 
16 A. Marini, ‘A Second Attempt at the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base’, EU inside, 2016, retrieved 
24 April 2018, http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/a-second-attempt-with-the-ccctb 
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discussions at the Council were quite fruitful.17 The proposal was withdrawn in 2016 by the 
Juncker Commission. 
In November 2014, the EC’s new President Jean-Claude Juncker assumed power and 
was determined to reform the sphere of corporate taxation. Back in July 2014, Juncker already 
had promised to “fight tax evasion and tax dumping through putting some morality, some 
ethics, into the European tax landscape” .18 
On the 25th of October 2016, the EC presented the two proposals that form the focus 
of this paper: the CCTB and the CCCTB. They represent a re-launch of the 2011 CCCTB 
proposal that has been modified and divided into two stages. The main goal of the proposals 
is to go forward with the harmonisation of corporate taxation in the EU through creation of a 
common consolidated tax base for companies that would only be mandatory for multinational 
enterprises. The two proposals would not affect tax rates but would drastically influence the 
way the profits of companies are calculated through the setting up of common rules and a 
consolidation formula to count a common tax base.19 The CCTB proposal “provides a single 
set of corporate tax rules for doing business across the internal market”.20 It foresees a 
possibility of a tax deduction for research and development costs, as well as for growth and 
investment.21 The CCCTB would bring the tax base to the next level through consolidation: 
it adds an apportionment formula in order to distribute the tax shares between the Member 
States.22  
                                                 
17 Interviews with officials, Permanent Representations of France and Ireland to the EU, Brussels, 5, 21 March 
2018. 
18 ‘Leaked Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals in Luxembourg’, International Consortium 
of Investigative Journalists, 2014, retrieved 25 April 2018, https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxembourg-
leaks/leaked-documents-expose-global-companies-secret-tax-deals-luxembourg/ 
19 ‘Taxation’, European Commission, retrieved 23 April 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/ 
taxation_en 
20 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM (2016) 
685 final, Strasbourg, 25 October 2016, p. 2. 
21 Ibid., p. 3. 
22 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM (2016) 683 final, Strasbourg, 25 October 2016, p. 15. 
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The main difference between the 2011 and the 2016 proposals, apart from the two-
stage approach, is that the 2011 proposal intended to set an optional system for companies to 
use the common tax base. However, the 2016 proposal would make following the tax base 
compulsory for MNEs (companies with a yearly turnover of more than EUR 750 million). 
The files are now under discussion at the Council. 
This research concentrates on understanding the reasoning behind the re-launch of the 
2011 CCCTB proposal in 2016, considering that it was unpopular among many Member 
States in the Council and had very little success in discussions.23 Thus, the research question 
is the following:  
“Why, without changing the unanimity rule and with little success in previous action, 
has the European Commission tabled a more ambitious politics for the harmonization of the 
corporate tax base?” 
To answer the research question, the multiple streams framework is applied. The main 
argument of the framework states that success of a policy depends on an interplay of three 
streams: problems, solutions and politics.24 According to Nikolaos Zahariadis, in order to 
understand this interplay, one needs to use coupling – “the notion that the effects of these three 
factors are not additive, but only a combination of all at the same time can produce the desired 
outcome”.25 Thus, the essential answer to the puzzle of the CCCTB is the position and strategy 
of the policy entrepreneur (hereafter the European Commission) who joins the streams 
together here in an opportune moment of a policy window to couple the existing solution 
(CCCTB) with the other streams. 
                                                 
23 Marini, loc. cit. 
24 N. Zahariadis, ‘Selling British Rail: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, Comparative Politics Studies, vol. 29, 
no. 4, 1996, p. 400. 
25 Ibid., p. 401. 
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H: The re-launch of the CCCTB proposal is due to the continuation of the EC strategy that 
has tried to use an opening in the ‘window of opportunity’ to push for more integration in the 
field of corporate taxation. 
This research is based upon: semi-structured interviews with the EU and MS officials 
(specifically, officials from the DG TAXUD, Alain Lamassoure, MEP EPP; officials from the 
French and the Irish Permanent Representations to the European Union); as well as analysis 
of documents (specifically texts of 1988, 2011 and 2016 CCCTB proposals, communications 
of the European Commission and the European Parliament; OECD/G20 documents; articles 
containing previous research on the topic). 
Theoretical framework 
The multiple streams framework “views the agenda-setting process as consisting of 
three streams that flow largely independently of one another”:26 
a) a stream consisting of information about problems; 
b) a ‘soup’ of solutions generated in narrow policy communities; 
c) a broad politics stream that consists of such dimensions as legislative and 
administrative turnover, the national mood and the balance of organized interests.27 
According to John Kingdon, issues may arise and get onto the agenda only when policy 
windows open, which is when there is an opportunity for the policy entrepreneurs to couple 
the three independent streams together.28 Nikolaos Zahariadis has built upon the work of 
Kingdon to explain the processes of policy formation and decision-making through the 
combination of the three streams in the politics stream and the coupling by the policy 
entrepreneur “to refer to the policy choice, not just setting the agenda”.29 He also extended 
Kingdon’s findings, emphasising the importance of ‘coupling’: “the structure of each stream 
                                                 
26 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, New York, Harper Collins, 1995. 
27 Zahariadis, ‘Selling British Rail: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, op. cit., p. 403. 
28 Kingdon, loc. cit. 
29 Zahariadis, ‘Selling British Rail: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, loc. cit. 
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is likely to condition the availability of problems, solutions and politics at any given moment, 
(and) the feature that will affect the choice directly is coupling”.30  
Zahariadis describes coupling as a “search for fit”31 in which, “Solutions scan their 
environments for clues to what problem they can solve; participants seek problems to attend 
to, and problems search for possible solutions”. It leads to the fact that “policy makers search 
for solutions to problems or they may attach problems to their pet solutions”.32 
Zahariadis’ work showed that coupling not only functions in the way that the problems 
influence the corresponding solutions, but also that possible solutions in a given political 
context look for which problems they can solve.33 Decisions would depend, first, on the policy 
entrepreneurs, and second, on the opportunity that provides the occasion for the policy to 
appear.34 The policy entrepreneurs constantly look to “match problems to appropriate 
solutions and vice versa while making it palatable to the political audience at an opportune 
time”.35 
I analyse the three attempts to propose the harmonization of corporate tax base on the 
EU level in 1988, 2011 and 2016 through looking at the proposals themselves and at the three 
streams (problems, solutions and politics), trying to understand whether there has been a 
window of opportunity, and whether the EC as the policy entrepreneur had the willingness and 
the strategy to couple the streams. The problems stream concentrates on problems existing in 
corporate taxation at the moment of the proposal. The solutions stream focuses on what the 
EC has actually proposed (as the policies may vary one from another) and whether the 
solutions are adequate responses to the problems. Finally, the stream of politics includes 
changes in the politics of the MS (possible pressure from governments, based on one of the 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 N. Zahariadis, ‘Garbage cans and the hiring process’, Political Sciences and Politics, no. 27, 1994, pp. 98-99. 
34 Zahariadis, ‘Selling British Rail: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, loc. cit. 
35 Ibid. 
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most supportive countries to the 2011 proposal – France, and one of the most opposing ones 
– Ireland); the situation in the EU (appointment of the new Commission (since 1st November 
2014); role of the EP); the possible influence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); the 
overall world global change in the way corporate taxation is perceived (on the example of 
G20/OECD work); and  public opinion (by using Google trends). The conclusion confirms the 
aforementioned hypothesis, which demonstrates that the EC managed to step up with a more 
ambitious CCCTB policy in 2016 as it strategically coupled the opening in the problems, 
solutions, and politics streams. 
 
THE 1988 ATTEMPT TO HARMONISE THE TAX BASE IN THE EEC 
Discussions to create a common corporate tax base have been held long before the 2011 
proposal. The first attempt to harmonize the corporate tax base was developed in 1988, but it 
has never been officially sent to the Council due to the “reluctance of most MS to support it”.36 
The draft of the 1988 pre-proposal has been discovered in the archives of the European 
Commission and is available only in French.  
The 1988 draft proposal 
The original 1988 draft proposal has technically the same goal as the 2016 proposal: 
to set the same rules for all enterprises to count their tax bases in the whole Community.37 The 
proposal starts with the explanation of the motives of the proposal: the main one is that there 
can be no internal market without putting in place a certain amount of rules linked to 
harmonisation of company taxation? as there can be no free movement if fiscal conditions 
                                                 
36 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper: Company Taxation in the 
Internal Market, SEC (2001) 1681, Brussels, 23 October 2001, p. 17. 
37 Commission des Communautés européennes, Projet de proposition de directive concernant l’harmonisation 
des règles de détermination des bénéfices imposables des entreprises, Bruxelles, 8 Novembre 1988, 
(unpublished). 
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vary drastically from one MS to another.38 According to the authors of the proposal, setting a 
common corporate tax base would be the first step towards harmonizing the corporate tax 
rules, as the harmonization of tax rates would follow.39 It would help achieve the following 
two objectives: bring more transparency to the regimes that are imposed on enterprises; and 
make the fiscal environment less complex and more stable for companies.40 The Commission 
underlined that this system would be particularly beneficial for SMEs, as the administrative 
costs of dealing with different tax administrations would be significantly reduced. It also 
underlined that these common rules potentially could increase competitiveness of European 
companies compared to foreign firms.41 
The 1988 proposal argues that even though the rules set out in the directive would be 
common, a lot of freedom would still remain with the MS, specifically, the application of the 
rules, but also tax credits and granting of subsidies. However, once the rules would be adopted, 
individual MS could not change them.42 Thus, the 1988 proposal is in many ways a precursor 
of a compulsory CCTB proposal for all types of enterprises. 
Analysis of the streams in 1988 
This draft proposal for setting common rules to determine taxable benefits of 
enterprises was blocked even before becoming an official Commission proposal. Why was 
there such a result in 1988?   
First of all, it is important to analyse whether there was an opening in the problem 
stream. Jacque Delors’ first Commission’s aim was to eliminate the barriers to the existence 
of the single market. Thus, the ultimate goal was removing obstacles for enterprises to operate 
freely. However, as this has been on the table since the creation of the EEC, this cannot be 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 3. 
42 Ibid., p. 4. 
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viewed as an opening in the problem stream. The motivations that have been expressed in the 
draft are quite similar: facilitating the rules for enterprises that operate in other MS 
(specifically the SMEs) and making the rules more transparent. Thus, all the benefits of 
solving the problem would be attributed to enterprises.  
It is also important to see whether there has been a significant event that could be used 
by the policy entrepreneur to bring the public attention to the issue and propose a solution. As 
no mention of such event has been identified in the motives of the proposal, I tend to conclude 
that there was no opening in the problems stream.  
The solution in the draft proposal presented in 1988 is technically the compulsory 
CCTB proposal (it defines common rules for calculating the tax base, such as tax amortisation 
benefits, costs, definitions of what is an active enterprise, taxation of capital gains, but does 
not propose a common consolidation formula). Does this solution respond to the problem it 
wishes to address? Judging on the impact assessment of the 2011 and 2016 proposals, the fact 
that the proposal would make it mandatory for all enterprises to obey common rules would 
have created an unproportioned financial burden.43 When comparing the 1988 proposal to the 
one of 2011, which opted for a voluntarily tax base, a more efficient way to address the 
problem of reducing tax burdens linked to cross-border trade by SMEs is indeed an optimal 
solution. 44 
In the politics stream, there also was no opening: in the Commission white paper 
“Completing the Internal Market”, no proposals for harmonization of direct (base or rate) tax 
rules were listed, and more attention is instead paid to indirect taxation (e.g. VAT).45 Although 
                                                 
43 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document 
to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC (2011) 
315 final, Brussels, 16 March 2011, p. 10. 
44 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM (2011) 121/4, loc. cit. 
45 Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, loc. cit. 
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it was announced that the EC had the intention to “publish a white paper on the taxation of 
enterprises”, no white paper has ever been presented, which shows that even the policy 
entrepreneur has changed its strategy.46 
The reason why the draft was prepared, but the Commission of the European 
Communities failed to even officially send it to the Council, has been offered by an official 
from the French Permanent Representation to the EU: the Commission only recently adopted 
the strategy of consulting with an important amount of MS before tabling its proposals and 
was mostly putting forward proposals upon request from several MS.47 Thus, it can be argued 
that no correlation has been made by the policy entrepreneur between the proposal and the 
situation in MS. However, further research could be done in order to detect a possible link. 
In this research, a lot of attention is paid to the international situation, particularly the 
influence of the most important international actor working on forming the rules of 
international taxation – the OECD.  The OECD states on its official website that it has become 
a “linchpin of a major overhaul of the international tax architecture…only since the London 
Summit in 2009”.48 Thus, the influence of the OECD on the politics stream cannot be 
considered as an opening in 1988. 
Building on the analysis of the 1988 draft proposal for harmonizing the rules for 
corporate tax base and of the three policy streams (problems, solutions and politics), as well 
as the fact that the proposal was blocked by the MS even before been sent to the Council, there 
has been no opening in any of the three streams. Secondly, the policy entrepreneur (the 
Commission) had no strategy to couple those streams, even with the information it had. 
 
                                                 
46 US International Trade Commission, The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European 
Community on the United States: Fifth Follow-up Report, USITC Publication 2628, April 1993. 
47 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Brussels, 21 March 
2018. 
48 Ibid. 
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THE 2011 PROPOSAL FOR AN OPTIONAL CCCTB 
The next proposal to create a CCCTB was presented on the 16th of March 2011.49 Its primary 
purpose was very similar to the previous one – “to remove the remaining obstacles to the 
completion of the Internal Market and stimulate growth and job creation”.50 However, the 
details of the proposed option varied drastically. This time the EC proposed an optional tax 
base for all EU companies:  
the CCCTB will be available for all sizes of companies; MNEs would be relieved 
from certain tax obstacles in the single market and SMEs would incur less 
compliance costs when they decide to expand to another MS.51  
Thus, what the proposal intended to achieve was to give more benefits to the European 
firms in the single market, so that they could count which option of the tax base would be 
more beneficial for them to use and return to the national taxation rules if needed. The proposal 
has been blocked at the Council, “where no visible progress was made since 2011, although it 
was discussed under various presidencies”.52 
Analysis of the streams in 2011 
To understand which problems were addressed by the 2011 proposal, impact 
assessment of the EC has been analysed. According to the document,  
The remaining tax barriers to the internal market that have prompted the current policy 
initiative were: additional compliance costs linked to cross-border activities, 
international double taxation, and over-taxation in cross border situations, which occur 
when cross-border activities create tax liabilities that would not occur in a purely 
domestic context.53 
 
                                                 
49 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM (2011) 121/4, op. cit., p. 1. 
50 Ibid., p. 4. 
51 Ibid., p. 5. 
52 ‘Legislative train schedule’, European Parliament, 2018, retrieved 23 April 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-
industrial-base-taxation. 
53 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document 
to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC (2011) 
315 final, op. cit., p. 9. 
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According to the impact assessment, additional compliance costs are the “hidden costs 
of taxation”.54 These costs, according to studies, are high (2-10% of the tax paid), hit SMEs 
more than MNEs, and, finally, are not becoming smaller with time.55 Concerning the second 
major problem – double taxation, it “has detrimental effects on efficiency and growth” and is 
a “significant problem for many EU enterprises”.56 Finally, the so-called over-taxation “occurs 
due to the absence or limited availability of cross-border loss relief”.57 All these problems lead 
to discouragement of cross-border economic activity.58 The proposal aims to address all of 
them.  
Could these problems be considered as an opening of the problems stream? When 
compared to the text of the 1988 draft proposal, the problems addressed stay practically the 
same. No major events have been described in the 2011 impact assessment document in order 
to justify the re-launch.  
A large impact assessment prepared for the 2011 proposal is the “comparison of the 
policy options”, in which four options “aiming to improve the competitive position of 
European companies by providing them with the possibility to compute their profits according 
to one set of rules” were presented: an optional CCTB; a compulsory CCTB; an optional 
CCCTB; and a compulsory CCCTB.59 An optional CCTB would create an option for EU-
resident companies to “compute their tax base pursuant to a set of common rules across the 
Union instead of any of the 27 national corporate tax systems. The compulsory option of the 
CCTB would oblige all the EU companies to follow this single set of rules”.60 The optional 
CCCTB would function as the optional CCTB, but the consolidation would mean that “tax 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 10. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p. 11. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM (2011) 121/4, loc. cit., p. 7. 
60 Ibid. 
13 
 
results of each group member would be aggregated to form a consolidated base and re-
distributed according to a pre-established sharing mechanism based on a formula”,61 which 
would substitute the ‘separate accounting’. Finally, the last option – the compulsory CCCTB 
– would oblige all EU established enterprises to follow this set of rules with consolidation.62 
The optional CCCTB was chosen as the most preferred option because it is estimated 
that it would have a positive impact on employment and it would not be forced on companies.63 
This is, indeed, a new solution that could be used by policy entrepreneurs to push decision 
makers to change the negative perception of the previous attempt. It tackles the ultimate issue 
of making it more convenient for companies to file their company tax reports. The official 
representative of the Irish Permanent Representation to the EU concludes that this policy 
choice would solely be beneficial for companies and, possibly, for the functioning of the 
internal market, but not at all for the MS.64 If each company has the right to choose to use the 
national tax bases or the CCCTB, it would make the necessary assessment and choose which 
option would be the most beneficial. Thus, MS might lose important amounts of tax revenue65 
and the proposal has not found sufficient support in the Council. 
The economic and financial crisis had a very important influence on how MS perceived 
the CCCTB proposal in 2011. As underlined by an official of the French Permanent 
Representation to the EU, MS were in a much better financial situation just before the financial 
crisis. However, by the time the proposal had actually been presented, the situation had 
worsened substantially.66 Officials from DG TAXUD pointed out that, as the proposal is not 
intended to be compulsory for companies, they would only use the common tax base if it 
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 8. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of Ireland to the European Union, Brussels, 5 March 
2018. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Brussels, 21 March 
2018. 
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would be to their advantage compared to the national tax bases.67 It follows that countries 
would possibly lose important sums of money, and even if it was not that  great of a problem 
for them before, in 2011 they could not take this risk.68 Therefore, the 2011 proposal was 
blocked in the Council, as it was considered inadequate and even dangerous for the MS. 
Moreover, an official of the French Permanent Representation confirmed that France 
and Germany had been advocating for the harmonisation of corporate tax base back in 2004-
2005, but by 2011, in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the situation became more difficult.69 
Thus, even with some support from MS, the proposal was not at all appealing to most of them, 
including its biggest former advocates. 
In order to assess whether there has been an opening in the politics stream at the level 
of the EU, the initiatives taken by the European institutions in between the 2001 
communication ‘Towards an internal market without tax obstacles: A strategy for providing 
companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities’, and the 2011 
proposal, as well as the amount of ECJ cases that could have opened a window of opportunity 
in the politics stream, ought to be considered.  
According to the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive on a 
CCCTB, the Commission announced a series of targeted measures in the area of corporate 
taxation, aimed at removing specific corporate tax barriers in the short term.70 However, these 
initiatives were focused more on the topic of tax evasion and transfer pricing, rather than on 
the topic directly related to the CCCTB rules (except for the communication on the need for 
coordination of MS tax policies). Still, according to the impact assessment accompanying the 
proposal, “many of these initiatives had led to hardly any action by MS and had no practical 
                                                 
67 Interview with officials, DG Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission, Brussels, 6 March 2018. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, Brussels, 21 March 
2018. 
70 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
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impact”.71 Thus, no evident impact of these initiatives can be seen on the opening in the 
politics stream. 
It is also important to consider the influence of the ECJ rulings. According to the EC 
impact assessment, “the number of cases in the area of company taxation referred to the ECJ 
has indeed grown considerably over the last 10 years…After 150 decisions in this area, there 
can be no doubt that the case law of the European Court of Justice has influenced the shaping 
of company taxation policy in the European Union”.72 While some of these cases concerned 
the interpretation of direct tax already existing in secondary law, the majority of them 
concerned the “compatibility of corporate tax provisions of the MS with the fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaty”.73 However, there was an important amount of judgements concerning 
MNEs, which can be directly related to the proposed optional CCCTB solution in 2011, as this 
system would facilitate cross-border activities for multinational companies. The impact 
assessment has drawn the conclusion that:  
[the] judicial process has its limitations and does not produce generally applicable 
solutions. As a result, taxpayers face considerable uncertainty as to how to interpret 
the principles of the jurisprudence of the ECJ when structuring cross-border activities 
within the EU. Also, as the Court only rules on the specific questions it has been 
addressed to, its jurisprudence cannot offer a systematic tool for tackling features of 
the Member States’ corporate tax systems which are in breach of EU law. It follows 
that it would not be advisable to rely solely on the judicial process to secure compliance 
with EU law. It is necessary to work in parallel and try to resolve problems through 
legislation, particularly where those are common to a number of Member States.74 
Thus, there has, indeed, been an increase in the amount of official EC and EP 
documents, as well as a vast increase of ECJ rulings in the area of direct corporate tax, which 
has been an opening in the politics stream.  
As it has been shown in the analysis of official documents as well as through the 
interviews with the officials, the aim of the proposal was to facilitate cross-border activities 
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for enterprises and to diminish the administrative costs for them. However, in 2010-2011 the 
international community was concentrated on trying to cope with the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. It can be viewed in the G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, which was called “the first 
Summit of the G20 in its new capacity as the premier forum for the international economic 
cooperation”. The declaration concentrated on coping with the remaining challenges that were 
demonstrated by the crisis: “uneven recovery, unemployment, and social impact of the 
crisis”.75 This corresponds to the aim of the EC to increase growth through removing 
additional barriers in the EU for enterprises. 
The impact assessment also refers to the work of the OECD: “the economic literature 
has emphasized that taxes on different bases have dissimilar implications for economic 
growth”.76 This demonstrates that the EC has started to actively use corresponding openings 
on the international level to justify its proposals. Even though no direct link between the 
creation of the optional CCCTB system and politics at the international level can be 
established, the EC referred to it in its justification. 
To conclude on the policy streams in 2011, I argue that there has been no window of 
opportunity in 2011– as there was no opening in the problem stream, as the problems 
addressed in the proposal are very similar to the draft of 1988. Concerning the international 
politics stream, no OECD/G20 recommendation has been put forward directly by the EC to 
argue for the proposal. Thus, an inopportune moment to table the proposal had been selected.77 
The solution proposed was seen to be inadequate and possibly negative for MS, and no 
coupling of the streams by the EC was thus possible. 
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THE AMBITIOUS 2016 RE-LAUNCH: THE FINAL CHAPTER?  
“Since 2011, new issues have come into light that reinforce the need for a common approach 
to corporate taxation in Europe”.78 
European Commission, 2016 CCCTB proposal 
 
On the 17th of June 2015, Commission presented the communication on ‘A Fair and 
Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action’, where it 
underlined the need to re-launch the 2011 CCCTB proposal as a way to holistically approach 
profit shifting.79 “CCCTB is a tool against tax avoidance”, as described by EU Tax 
Commissioner Pierre Moscovici during his speech on tax fairness.80 What is interesting is that 
the 2011 proposal (just like the one of 1988) concentrated mostly on solving the problem of 
eliminating burdens for enterprises to operate in the single market, rather than on fighting 
shifting profits.  
This section presents the 2016 CCTB and CCCTB proposals and discuss why, after the 
blockage at the Council, the proposal has been re-launched in a more ambitious form. 
The CCTB and the CCCTB proposals 
On the 25th of November 2016, the two proposals – CCTB and CCCTB – were 
officially presented.81 What are the main differences? First of all, the EC has adopted a two-
stage approach: the CCTB should first be discussed and adopted at the Council, as the CCCTB 
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has been too complex to be discussed at once.82 Another major change to the 2011 version of 
the proposal is that the CCTB and the CCCTB should be mandatory for MNEs.83 
The CCTB proposal is presented as a “way forward towards a CCCTB” and is the first 
step of the two-step approach.84 The CCTB is “limited to the elements of the common base , 
i.e. rules for calculating the corporate tax base, including certain provisions against tax 
avoidance and on the international dimension of the proposed tax system”.85 Additionally, the 
proposal covers two new topics compared to the 2011 proposal: super-deduction for research 
and development, and rules against debt bias.86 
The CCCTB proposal concentrates on building upon the common base and “computing 
the tax base of companies which are tax resident in the EU and of EU-located branches of 
third-country companies”.87 So, in detail, the CCCTB, just as the 2011 proposal, would allow 
for the computation of “each company’s individual tax results, the consolidation of those 
results when there are other group members and the appointment of the consolidated tax base 
to each eligible MS”.88 
The main novelty, as was already underlined, is the fact that CCTB and the CCCTB 
would be compulsory for MNEs and optional for SMEs, thus addressing the problems of tax 
evasion by MNEs, boosting growth of SMEs, and removing the remaining obstacles in the 
internal market for cross-border economic activities. 
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The three policy streams: the time of strategic coupling has come? 
“The ultimate answer to the question why CCCTB has been re-launched in 2016 is Lux 
Leaks.”89 
Alain Lamassoure, MEP 
 
By analysing the three policy streams for the 2016 re-launched CCTB and CCCTB 
proposals, I aim to demonstrate that there has, indeed, been an opening in all of them. This has 
presented a window of opportunity for the EC, and it has used it in a political momentum. 
The revolution of the 2016 re-launch lies in the fact that the EC has chosen to address 
two major problems through one solution: diminishing the costs for SMEs to pursue cross-
border economic activities (through the creation of an optional single system of counting the 
tax base) and fighting tax evasion of MNEs (through making it compulsory for them to apply 
the common rules). The latter had become a very important issue at the international level in 
2014.  
On the 6th of November 2014, the world found out about one of the biggest tax scandals 
in history, the so-called Lux Leaks, that demonstrated that “one of the EU’s smallest states 
helped multinationals save millions in tax, to the detriment of its neighbours and allies”.90 The 
revelations changed the way the world community viewed corporate taxation, demonstrating 
“that over 340 multinational companies use schemes to avoid paying taxes – schemes made 
possible by Luxembourg's particularly favourable tax laws”.91 I argue that this event led to an 
opening in the problems stream for the re-launch of the CCCTB in 2016. It can be 
demonstrated by analysing the impact assessment and understanding the problems the new 
proposals addresses.  
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The impact assessments of the 2011 and the 2016 CCCTB proposals vary drastically: 
“Practically the same proposal” (solution) is being presented through the angle of solving two 
different problems”.92 The main problem identified in the impact assessment for the 2011 
CCCTB proposal is the difficulty for businesses that are active in different MS to confront 27 
various and possibly constantly changing tax regimes.93 This is seen to lead to the creation of 
the so-called tax-barriers, such as additional compliance costs for businesses, over-taxation, 
or double taxation.94 These tax barriers “directly hinder the achievement of the Internal 
Market”.95 The general objective of the proposal has been to “improve the simplicity and 
efficiency of the corporate income tax systems in the EU”, that would further “impact 
competitiveness and performance of enterprises”. 96 The impact assessment of the 2016 
proposal differs drastically from the previous one. The main problems to be addressed were 
identified to be fighting aggressive tax planning strategies of MNEs, coping with the tax-
induced company finance structures, and making it easier for EU businesses to invest in 
R&D.97 The main motive of the impact assessment is concentrated on fighting corporate tax 
avoidance.98 For this reason, the CCCTB is being made compulsory for MNEs and optional 
for SMEs.  
The reactions to the Lux Leaks have been very sharp; the New York Times has 
described it as a “rising furor” in Europe.99 Juncker, then recently appointed President of the 
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EC, was exposed to a lot of criticism from all sides.100 Even a vote was organised for the 
motion of censure against Juncker at the European Parliament, which was, however, rejected 
by a large majority of MEPs on the 12th of November 2014.101 Furthermore, at the G20 
Leaders’ Summit that took place on 15-16 November, “Juncker’s EC presidency was 
compared to ‘Dracula in charge of blood bank’”.102 The MS also reacted: French Minister of 
Finance Michel Sapin  stated that “taxes must be paid be it by individuals or business and no 
one has the right – even legally – to place themselves beyond this obligation”, adding that “the 
EC now has a chance to show it is a real Commission and that it has the will to put an end to 
situations like this”.103 This could be seen as an open call on the EC to start the action against 
tax avoidance. Thus, there has been an important opening in the problems stream of corporate 
tax avoidance and the world reaction to it, and the CCCTB was seen as a solution.  
The solution that was proposed in 2011 has been changed slightly in order to better 
address the new problem of corporate tax evasion and the old one of removing the remaining 
barriers for cross-border economic activities.104 Thus, the proposal aims to make the common 
rules compulsory for MNEs (those with the annual turnover of over 750 million EUR, that, 
according to the impact assessment, account for approximately 64% of the general turnover) 
and optional for SMEs, in order to boost their growth and let them choose which tax base rules 
– national or common - would be more beneficial for them.105 According to an official from 
the Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, the solution does not vary 
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much from the previous one but has only been adapted slightly, as the EC had to make “a 
different packaging to change the narrative”.106 The official also argued that the CCCTB 
proposal would not directly tackle tax avoidance, as the re-launch represents an opportunity 
to push for more harmonization of corporate taxation in the EU. 
Additionally, some of the solutions that were discussed at the Council concerning the 
2011 proposal have been incorporated in the re-launched initiative. For example, the two-
stage approach was proposed by Ireland in order to simplify the discussions.107 Another point 
that has been argued by both officials of Permanent Representations of MS and by the DG 
Taxation and Customs Union is that the 2016 proposals build upon mistakes that MS have 
made before and thus aim to share the ‘good practices’ within the EU.108 Thus, the ‘verified 
solutions’ have been incorporated in the 2016 CCTB and CCCTB proposals. This has been 
an important adaptation to the old solution that incorporated parts of the MS’ good practices 
and slightly changed the rules, but which did not propose an entirely new policy (compared 
to the previous attempts).  
In order to understand whether there has been a radical change in the approach of MS, 
I analysed whether the MS that have been advocating for the harmonization of corporate tax 
base before (notably France and Germany), as well as those MS which were the most opposing 
to the 2011 proposal, have changed their opinion. Interviews were conducted with tax attachés 
from the Permanent Representation of France (one of the most supportive MS to the 2011 
proposal) and from the Permanent Representation of Ireland (one of the most opposing MS to 
the 2011 proposal). The assumptions concerning the relation of a MS towards the proposal 
have been made based on Council reports.  
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I also analysed whether the Brexit vote had an influence on the timing of the proposal, 
as the UK was one of the most opposing MS (the Brexit referendum took place on the 23rd of 
June 2016 and the re-launch of the CCCTB proposal was on the 25th of October). 
First of all, as it has already been demonstrated, Germany and France were pushing 
for the proposal back in 2004-2005 and continued to do so in 2016.109 Additionally, Germany 
and France have been working on the bilateral common corporate tax base that is considered 
a basis for the EU agreement.110 However, an important number of MS, such as Belgium, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands together with Ireland, were not 
supportive of the proposal, as in 2011: 
Small Member States are afraid of harmonization to lose their competitiveness 
(Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Hungary; Baltics; Sweden, etc.) Germany and France 
do want it, but also have different approaches: France would prefer allowing national 
deductions and Germany would rather have full harmonisation.111 
According to an official from the French Permanent Representation, the situation at 
the Council was much better in 2016 than in 2011. This, however, was not due to the fact that 
MS’ approaches have changed, but mostly because of the growing amount of discussions and 
higher number of legislation linked to corporate tax that was successfully adopted.112 Thus, 
there has not been an important opening in the politics stream on the national level, as 
countries such as France and Germany have continued to actively support the proposal, 
whereas many MS have continued to oppose it just as before. Furthermore, the argument that 
the opening in the politics stream has been linked to Brexit has been rejected by both 
Permanent Representations of MS to the EU that were interviewed as well as by the DG 
Taxation and Customs Union at the EC. 
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Concerning the EU level, the role of the EP in the 2016 re-launch should also be taken 
into account. According to the EPP MEP Alain Lamassoure, the EP has played a very 
important role in the CCCTB re-launch, as it has reacted very actively to the Lux Leaks 
revelations and called on the European Commission to undertake the actions needed to fight 
tax avoidance.113 In February 2015, the EP “adopted the request setting up the special 
committee on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect by 612 votes in favour, 
19 against, and 23 abstentions”.114 On the 26th of November 2015, the EP adopted the 
“recommendations on how to make corporate taxes fairer across Europe”.115 One of the 
recommendations of the EP called to: 
Put an end to transfer pricing, preferential regimes, mismatches between national tax 
systems and the issues leading to tax base erosion at European level through a 
compulsory EU-wide common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB, which should 
be introduced as soon as possible).116 
Thus, there has been a definite opening in the EP politics. However, the DG Taxation 
and Customs Unions officer has stated that there has been no direct linkage, and even though 
this would make it easier to justify the proposal, as the EP has only a consultative role in 
taxation issues, the role of MS has been much more important in the re-launch. They also 
revealed that the EC tends to use the political message of the European Parliament in order to 
receive support by a political body that is pushing for the politics that it has aimed to do.117 
Concerning the influence of the rulings of the Court of Justice, the officials from the 
DG Taxation and Customs Union, as well as the MEP Alain Lamassoure have denied that it 
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had any influence on the re-launch: “The ECJ no longer makes revolutionary judgements as it 
did in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s”.118 
It is also important to consider the amount of secondary legislation that has been 
adopted in the field of direct corporate taxation in the EU in recent years, as it could have a 
potential influence on the CCCTB file: ATAD, the directive on mismatches with third 
countries, the directive on double-taxation dispute resolution mechanism, and the conclusions 
on the criteria and process leading to the establishment of the EU list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions for tax purposes were all adopted in 2015-2016.119 According to an official of the 
French Permanent Representation to the European Union, this is very important, because it 
has totally changed the atmosphere at the Council during discussions on legislation on 
corporate taxation. This can be considered as an opening in the politics stream in the EU level, 
as not only the EP had pushed for action, but the atmosphere at the Council of Ministers has 
become more positive towards discussing tax harmonization.120 
Finally, the influence of international politics on the politics stream should be 
discussed through the analysis of the official documents and declarations of the OECD, as well 
as G20 leaders. Another point of analysis is the public opinion towards tax avoidance that is 
to be demonstrated based on the results of Google trends. 
The OECD’s “Global Forum was restructured in response to a G20 request to 
strengthen the implementation of standards and to launch an ambitious peer-review process of 
national legislation in the realm of tax transparency”.121 The work of the OECD that has 
influenced the EU taxation policies and the CCCTB in particular (as it is stated in the 2016 
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CCCTB impact assessment) is BEPS – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting that was started in 
2013.122 BEPS is the work, developed by the OECD on the request of G20, to cope with the 
situation that “multinational companies avoid taxation in their home countries by pushing 
activities abroad to low or no tax jurisdictions”.123  
However, according to Alain Lamassoure, the CCCTB proposal does not take much 
from BEPS (as, for example, the proposal on country-by country reporting, or ATAD), but 
goes further than the OECD.124 This has also been demonstrated in the impact assessment, 
which underlined that “the directive against tax avoidance practices included most of the 
elements of the international and BEPS related aspects of the CCCTB”.125 Thus, parts of the 
2011 CCCTB proposal have already been included in the 2016 ATAD proposal that was built 
on BEPS. Therefore, there is no direct link between BEPS and the 2016 CCCTB re-launch.  
The change of the perception of corporate taxation can be clearly seen in the G20 
communication. The Leaders’ Communiqué of the Brisbane Summit that took place in 
November 2014 has concentrated a lot on “preventing cross-border tax evasion”.126 
Another important point that can be an opening in the politics stream is public opinion 
towards corporate taxation, specifically fighting tax avoidance of multinational enterprises. 
Measuring public opinion is not an easy task. Due to the fact that better sources cannot be 
found for my research, the data used to measure whether public opinion considering the need 
to control corporate taxation at the EU level will be sourced from the Google trends. I analysed 
the searches of the keywords linked to the problems addressed in the 2016 proposal: tax 
avoidance; tax evasion; profit shifting. The maximum number of searches on ‘tax evasion’ 
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and ‘tax avoidance’ which took place in between 2011 and 2016 has taken place in April 
2016.127 The maximum number of searches for ‘profit shifting’ was in August 2016.128 Thus, 
the maximum was hit when the policy was in development and right before it was proposed 
in November 2016. This could also be considered an opening in the politics stream. 
Thus, we have seen that there was a major change in the way corporate taxation is 
viewed in the world, as well as in the EU and its MS, since the 2011 proposal had been tabled. 
The scandals linked to tax evasion that leaked to the outside world, especially Lux Leaks, 
have changed the perception of the world on tax avoidance. This has served as an important 
opening in the politics stream in 2016. 
New problem, adapted old solution, what kind of politics? 
This section identified that the 2016 re-launched CCCTB proposal has changed the 
problem it addresses: now the main concentration is on fighting corporate tax avoidance 
(linked to the leaks about corporate tax avoidance of MNEs). The solution has been slightly 
modified and the analysis of the politics stream has revealed an opening on every level, that 
was linked to Lux Leaks. I apply the findings of the last section to the research question and 
test the hypothesis that were developed in the introduction. 
The research question aimed to understand why, without changing the unanimity rule 
and with little success in previous action, the European Commission started a more ambitious 
politics of harmonization of the corporate tax base. The core hypothesis has suggested that the 
ambitious re-launch of the CCCTB proposal in 2016 can be explained by applying the multiple 
streams framework to the attempts of the proposal, resulting in the conclusion that in 2016 the 
European Commission, as the policy entrepreneur, has strategically and willingly used the 
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window opportunity by coupling the openings in the streams of problems, stream of solutions, 
and stream of politics. The hypothesis has been verified in the research, as the analysis has 
revealed that the previous attempts to harmonize the corporate tax base involved no coupling, 
as there were no openings in the problems stream. However, the Lux Leaks that have revealed 
massive tax avoidance of MNEs have created an opening in the problems stream and the 
politics stream. The EC managed to slightly adapt the existing solution to the new problem 
and use the political situation (national, EU, and international) as well as public opinion to 
push for a more ambitious policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
“Coupling can be viewed as a search for fit; solutions scan the environment as to what 
problems they can solve, participants seek problems to attend to, and problems search for 
possible solutions”.129 
Nikolaos Zahariadis 
 
This paper concentrated on the 2016 proposal of the European Commission for the 
creation of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the EU. It has been demonstrated 
that even though the first draft proposal for a compulsory common corporate tax base prepared 
back in 1988 was blocked even before being officially sent to the Council, and the 2011 
proposal for an optional CCCTB was also blocked at the Council, the EC re-launched the 
proposal in 2016, making it compulsory for multinational enterprises.  
After having analysed the evolution of the CCCTB file through the prism of the 
multiple streams framework, the ultimate conclusion is that the policy entrepreneur (the EC) 
managed to couple the three streams:  
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• The problem stream – corporate tax avoidance, which has been demonstrated by the 
different leaks linked to corporate taxes, such as Lux Leaks;   
• The solutions stream (the previous CCCTB proposal that has been modified by 
adapting certain parts of the Councils’ solutions identified as the 2011 proposal was 
discussed (super-deduction for R&D; two-stage approach, good practices) and the 
solution to the problem (making CCCTB compulsory for multinationals to respond to 
the tax avoidance); 
• The politics stream (choice of momentum linked to the appointment of the new 
Commission in 2014, the EP work on limiting tax evasion, continuous demand on the 
side of some of the MS to proceed with the CCCTB) and the change in the overall 
world conception of corporate taxation (demonstrated by the evolution of the 
OECD/G20 work).  
Thus, there were openings in each of the three streams that created a window of opportunity 
for the EC to choose the political momentum and use the process of coupling in order to attain 
its goal – to further the harmonisation of corporate taxation in the EU. 
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